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Illusory Imagination versus Nihilistic
Reason
A Historical-Philosophical Case Study of the Role of
Imagination in Religion
We play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but (as fantasy) the
imagination just as often plays with us, sometimes very inconveniently.1
With the progress of reason, many feelings constantly get lost, and many
moving associations of the imagination become weaker.2
1 Introduction
The quotations of Kant andHegel, given above, serve as amotto of this paper.
They immediately lead us to the heart of the problematicwhichwe are dealingwith
during this conference. If all three classic transcendentals, viz. the true, the good,
and the beautiful, reveal something of God's transcendent reality, then art and
imagination belong to the core of religion. Many philosophers and theologians
have pointed to the fact that prayers, rituals, and religious works of art move the
religiousheart ofmanmoreprofoundly, andbringhimcloser toGod thanall proofs
of his existence together. Pascal already warned us against a naive trust in reason,
especially with regard to matters that affect humans existentially: `Le coeur a ses
raisons que la raison ne connaît pas.'3 From this perspective, the weakening of
religious imagination and the disappearing of its products from the churches and
the collective memory of Christians are a major impoverishment of religion. But
on the other hand, the use of imagination in religion also introduces the risk of
illusion or superstition. Doesn't imagination inevitably lead to a wishful thinking
about God, to a projection of our own expectations and desires on an imaginary
transcendent being? Let me give an example: since for me, being a philosopher
is not only a job like another, but involves also an aspect of vocation, I venerate
Saint Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of philosophers. I even have a picture
of him in my study in order to make my veneration more concrete. Looking
at this picture helps me to keep my thinking concentrated on what philosophy
essentially is all about: the rational quest for truth, combined with the trust that
this quest, although real truth lies beyond the capacities of human reason, is yet
not in vain. I even can imagine that my veneration for Thomas gives me the
1. I. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 2. Auage (1800), 80. In the follow-
ing, I refer to this work in the main text as (Anthropologie. . . ).
2. G.W.F. Hegel,Gesammelte Werke, Band 1, Frühe Schriften, Hamburg, 1989, 124. In the
following, I refer to this edition in the main tekst as (GW 1. . . ).
3. B. Pascal, Pensées, 277.
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strength of mind, necessary to write a good paper. Although I am not able to
present many rational arguments for the effectiveness of my veneration of saints
for my thinking, I am condent that it works, or at least helps a little bit. But on
the other hand, imagination can also play an inconvenient game with me; it can
generate all kinds of religious illusion and superstition inme, both as a reasonable
and as amoral being. If, in spite of all my pleas to Saint Thomas for understanding
and insight, my paper would turn out to be a complete disaster, it yet would be
an act of superstition to remove Thomas's picture from my study or put it in the
corner for punishment. So, the relevance of the imagination for religion cannot
be conrmed just like that, but asks for further examination. What can be the
relevance of religious imagination for faith and to which problems does a naive
trust in imagination give cause?
In relation to the foregoing, anotherquestion immediately arises, viz. regard-
ing the rational status of philosophy of religion. If it really is so that imagination
belongs to the essence of religion, what does this mean for the kind of rationality
of philosophy of religion? Can reason still hold on to its `enlightened' conviction
that it should distance itself as much as possible from religious imagination, since
the latter is only a source of superstition? For many centuries, the only type of
rational reection on religion was an immanent one, i.e. a philosophical con-
templation of religious truths within a theological framework. In this situation,
philosophy could smoothly leave imagination to religious artists and their theolog-
ical advisors. Philosophical rationality and religious imagination complemented
each other very well, for they both were part of an all-embracing divine order. But
in the course of modernity, this order falls apart, and a secular idea of rationality
and truth emerges. This situation gives rise to the birth of philosophy of religion
in the strict sense of the word. It is no longer the handmaid of theology, and does
no longer content itself with its apologetic task. Moreover, it not only describes
the phenomenon of religion philosophically, but also critically examines its ra-
tionality. In this context, philosophy of religion gets more and more difculties
with those elements in Christian religion, which are at odds with its (presumed)
rational core. It wants to preserve religion from illusion and deceit. Miracles
are the most obvious example of this danger, but by extension one can also think
of other products of religious imagination. The well-known opposition between
revealed and natural religion is the most striking illustration of this evolution.
During the Enlightenment, natural religion and theology are proclaimed to be the
critical standard of revealed religion. On the basis of this conviction, different
conceptions of their mutual relationship are possible: some are convinced that
revealed religion has become obsolete, while others consider it to be in accordance
with natural religion and look upon it as a preparation for rational religion. In
any case, enlightened philosophy perceives a clear opposition between the general
acceptability and reasonableness of natural religion and the particularity and con-
fusing multiplicity of revealed religions. In this situation, religious imagination is
doomed to play a completely subordinate role, or even to disappear altogether out
of sight of the philosophers of religion. The rationalization of religion inevitably
seems to be at the expense of religious imagination. But as a result of this, one can
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critically ask whether this rationalizing tendency has not in fact and in principle
amounted to an impoverishing reduction of religion. Doesn't religious imagina-
tion bear in itself a unique truth, to which the enlightened understanding is blind?
Even if one accepts it as inevitable that living religion is always richer than the
understanding of it by reason, doesn't it nevertheless belong to the essence of phi-
losophy to look for ways to think the truth that is present in religious imagination?
These questions lead to other ones, which concern the rationality of philosophy
of religion itself. If imagination belongs to the essence of religion, how can phi-
losophy do justice to it? What kind of reason does philosophy of religion need
to be able to think the truth of religious imagination? In sum, is an `imagining
rationality' conceivable and what does it mean?
The reference to the Enlightenment, made above, already offers an indica-
tion of the way, in which I want to limit somewhat the scope and complexity of
my answers to the two leading questions. A complete historical survey of the
relations between religion and imagination, as much as of its implications for the
rationality of philosophy of religion, would largely exceed the framework of this
paper. Therefore I want to limit myself to a historical-philosophical case study.
More specically, I want to examine the discussion between Kant and Hegel on
the issue whether religion has to appeal not only to reason, but also to imagina-
tion. But a purely historical account of this discussion is of little relevance for
philosophy of religion as a systematic philosophical discipline. Therefore, in the
concluding paragraphs of each section and in the conclusion of this paper, I will
draw some systematic conclusions with regard to the function of the imagination
in religion. Furthermore, I want to analyze the systematic implications of these
diverging historical answers. What kind of rationality should philosophy of reli-
gion develop in order to be capable of thinking religious imagination. With regard
to Kant, I will focus on his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and the
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. As far as Hegel is concerned, I will
discuss an early fragment of his so-called Tübingen Essay, in which he explicitly
pays attention to the importance of imagination (or fantasy) for religion.
2 Imagination as a source of illusion
In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which was published
in 1798, Kant speaks about the faculty of imagination (the facultas imaginandi)
as a capacity, which lies between sensibility and understanding. It is `a faculty of
perception without the presence of the object' (Anthropologie, 69). There are two
different faculties of imagination, the productive and the reproductive one. The
productive faculty offers an original representation of the object (i.e. without a
preceding experience) in the human mind. An example: when an artist wants to
make a sculpture, he rst needs to represent its image in his mind. On the other
hand, the examination of the reproductive faculty of imagination shows that its
representation of an object is derived from previous empirical perceptions. The
faculty of imagination recalls them to mind, as is the case when we remember
something or somebody on the base of the laws of association. In both cases,
these representations are produced voluntarily. When the faculty of imagination
http://www.ArsDisputandi.org
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produces images involuntarily, it is called fantasy.
Although the creative element plays amore prominent role in the productive
faculty of imagination than in the reproductive one, yet the former is not entirely
creative. As little as the reproductive faculty, the productive one `does not have
the power to produce a sense impression which has never before occurred to our
senses. One can always identify the material, which gave rise to that impression'
(Anthropologie, 69). Someone, who e.g. has never seen the color red before, can
by no means produce a representation of red with his imagination. In religion,
imagination is also present, as becomes clear in religious art. The faculty of
imagination, with which we are dealing here, is obviously the productive one.
For we cannot found our religious imaginations directly on sensory perception;
nobody has ever seen God. Yet, neither in this case the imagination is entirely
productive, sincewecandemonstrate fromwhere it receives itsmaterial. Religious
imagination can take its material directly from experiences of divine revelation.
But usually it appeals to already existing imaginations, such as the Bible and
other inspired texts. Thus, religious imagination is always embedded in a long
tradition of given images. I will illustrate this by the example of the tradition
of imagining the Holy Trinity in Christian art. One of the oldest examples is
the image of the three angels visiting Abraham and Sara (a mosaic in the Santa
Maria Maggiore in Rome from the 5th century, and of course the famous icon of
Andrey Rublyov from the 15th century). But we can also think of the baptism of
Christ in the river Jordan, with a hand coming from heaven, and a dove. Other
traditional images of the Trinity are three crossing circles, or the image of God
as an old man, bearing the crucied Christ, with a dove ying above them (the
so-called chair of grace, painted by Albrecht Dürer in the 16th century). These
examples show that religious imagination is never completely free, but is always
bound by given material, viz. an iconographic tradition, which is based on images
that have accepted as successful representations of the Trinity. So `however great
an artist the imagination may be, even if it is a sorceress, it is still not creative,
but must gather the material for its images from the senses' (Anthropologie, 70).
As a conclusion, one can say that the faculty of imagination is a combination of
receptivity (the material of the imagination has to be given to the senses) and
spontaneity (the way, in which the faculty of imagination creates a representation
from the given material, is free).
Precisely because of its mediating function between sensibility and under-
standing, the productive faculty of imagination plays a crucial role in Kant's Cri-
tique of pure reason. On the one hand, the faculty of imagination belongs to
sensibility; it is the only faculty that can offer to the concepts of understanding a
corresponding representation. Thus, thanks to (the schemes of) this productive
imagination, the categories of understanding receive their meaning. On the other
hand, the synthesis of the faculty of imagination is an expression of spontane-
ity, for it is capable to determine sensibility a priori. `Its synthesis of intuitions,
conforming as it does to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of
imagination. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility,
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and is its rst application to the objects of our possible intuition.'4 The faculty of
imagination enables us to apply the unity and universality of the categories to the
multiplicity and particularity of sensory representations. Therefore, without the
faculty of imagination no knowledge at all possible, although we are only rarely
aware of its action.
Although Kant considers imagination to be crucial for knowledge, he is over-
all opposed to man's free use of it. The faculty of imagination can become dan-
gerous, since it can produce effects that are sometimes similar to hallucinations,
aroused by drugs. In some situations even, the products of the faculty of imag-
ination are nothing else than supposed inner perceptions or fantasmatism.5 In
order to delineate the illusory effects of productive imagination as clearly as pos-
sible from its positive ones, he makes the following distinction: `Originality of the
imagination is called genius when it harmonizes with notions. If originality does
not harmonize with notions, then it is called fantasmatism' (Anthropologie, 76).
The notions, of which Kant speaks here, are in fact empirically based concepts.
Thus, it is crucial for imagination to have a solid empirical foundation in order
to prevent it from deteriorating into fantasmatism. If there is no empirical ba-
sis, imagination inevitably produces its fantasmatic effects only as a derivative of
man's spontaneous, boundless expectations and desires.
What does the foregoing analysis teach us about the function of imagination
in religion? Does it necessarily lead to fantasmatism, or does it also have a positive
effect? The core of the problem is that, in religious matters, man by denition has
no immediate sensory experience to keep his imagination under control and to
preserve him from illusion. In order to clarify this important issue, Kant departs
from an example of religious imagination, already given above, viz. the repre-
sentation of the Trinity as an old man, a young man, and a dove. Because the
three persons of the Trinity are reasonable beings, man can only imagine them
by anthropomorphizing them, i.e. by imagining them as human beings (at least,
as far as the Father and the Son are concerned). However, it is evident that these
anthropomorphic images are by no means similar to the real, transcendent object
(the Trinity) they represent. The Trinity, which we imagine as three persons,
is completely different from our experience of human persons. The question is
whether in religion a correct use of the imagination is possible. Can we conceive a
kind of religious imagination that takes into account the essential dissimilarity be-
tween the transcendent essence of the Trinity and its image? Or does it inevitably
destroy this dissimilarity, thus ending in fantasmatism? The only possibility to
escape the danger of illusion is by keeping in mind that the image of the Trinity
as human beings is symbolic one. A symbol is indeed a product of imagination,
yet it can never substitute the object it symbolizes. Its symbolic quality precisely
depends on the distance it maintains between the symbolic image (the old man,
the young man and the dove) and the transcendent reality it represents (the Trin-
ity). `We have to anthropomorphize if we want to provide our notions of rational
4. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 152.
5. It is almost impossible to nd a correct translation of the German word Schwärmerei. In
English translations of Kant's work, it is translated both as `fanaticism' and `enthusiasm'. I prefer
the neologism fantasmatism, in order to stress its emotionally exaggerated and illusory character.
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beings with illustration. It is, however, unfortunate and childish if, as a conse-
quence, the symbolic representation becomes the notion for the object as such'
(Anthropologie, 76, Note). If man does not observe the distinction between the
symbolic representation and what is being symbolized, he takes his imaginations
for reality and falls back into illusions. Philosophy is the critical authority to ex-
amine the symbolic character of every religious imagination. It should discourage
the bad tendency to substitute the transcendent religious object by products of
the imagination. In sum, its task is to preserve religious humans from wishful
thinking, as an intellectual form of illusion.
What role does imagination play in Kant'sReligionwithin the Limits of Rea-
son Alone? How does he judge in this work the connection between imagination
and religion? What strikes one most, is that his attitude towards imagination in
this text is much more negative than in his Anthropology, which was published
ve years later. In the rst place, this is so because in his pragmatic Anthropol-
ogy, Kant discusses the faculty of imagination in a `pragmatic' framework, i.e.
`the investigation of what man makes, can, or should make of himself as a freely
acting being' (Anthropologie, IV). In the Religion, on the other hand, he is specif-
ically occupied with the function of imagination in moral religion. But there is
also another reason for this difference, which is more important for us. In his
Anthropology, Kant situates the illusions, to which the faculty of imagination can
give rise, mainly on an intellectual level, whereas in the Religion, he focuses all
his attention on the moral illusions, which our imagination produces. Because of
their dramatic consequences for man as a moral being, Kant judges these moral
illusions much more severely than the intellectual ones.
As is common knowledge, he considers religion as subordinate to morality:
`Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine
commandments.'6 Therefore, the content of the only true religion can only con-
sist in those practical principles, which are essential to man's moral actions. This
means that inmoral, merely reasonable religion, an appeal to sensibility and imag-
ination, in sum for anthropomorphic representations, as possible approaches to
God, is out of question. Also with regard to the requirements, which the true,
visible church has to meet in order to serve its purpose (viz. the representation
of the moral Kingdom of God on earth, as far as man can contemplate it), sensi-
bility and imagination are explicitly excluded. The true church can only appeal
to moral motives, and has to be `cleansed of the nonsense of superstition and
the madness of fantasmatism' (Religion, 143). As a consequence of this, Kant
offers an overall moral interpretation of the Trinity, which illustrate his approach
to delineate moral motives in religion as clearly as possible from all other ones.
Trinity appears as the three specically different ways, in which God wants to
be served as morally qualied, viz. as supreme lawgiver, goodness, and justice.
`In order to designate this moral quality, the expression of different (not physi-
cally, but morally) personalities of one and the same being is not unsuitable. And
this creed of faith at the same time expresses the whole of pure moral religion'
6. I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 2. Auage (1794),
230. In the following, I refer to this work in the main text as (Religion. . . ).
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(Religion, 214). Every other representation of the Trinity than a moral one is a
reprehensible kind of anthropomorphism. `Faith in it as an extension of theo-
retical cognition of the divine nature would only be the profession of a creed of
ecclesiastical faith totally unintelligible to human beings or, if they think that they
understand it, the profession of an anthropomorphic creed. And not the least
would thereby be accomplished for moral improvement' (Religion, 215). Thus,
it becomes clear that, as far as religion within the boundaries of mere reason is
concerned, an anthropomorphic representation of the Trinity is completely out
of question. Religious imagination inevitably introduces a sensuous element into
religion, thereby deterring man from the virtuous conduct in life as the only way
to become well-pleasing to God.
This interpretationof the faculty of imagination in theReligiondemonstrates
that theproblemof religious illusiongetshere anewdimension in comparisonwith
theAnthropology. In theReligion the issue is not somuch the `intellectual' error to
take one's imaginations for reality, but themoral consequences of religious illusion
for humans. Whereas in the theoretical representation of God and his essence
by the faculty of imagination, anthropomorphism (being the source of religious
illusion as such) is hardly avoidable and is rather harmless (cf. anthropomorphism
as unfortunate and childish), it `is highly dangerous with respect to our practical
relation to his [God's] will and to our morality. For, since we are making a
God for ourselves, we create him in the way we believe that we can most easily
win him over to our advantage' (Religion, 257). In the practically-moral kind of
anthropomorphism, man creates with the help of his imagination a God, which
he serves in other ways than by a virtuous conduct in life. In this context one can
e.g. think of the festivities and public games in honor of a God in ancient Greece
and Rome. But one can also refer to the products of religious art in Christian
faith. In any case, all these manifestations of religious imagination deter man
from the true, moral religion: `Apart from a good conduct in life, anything which
the human being supposes that he can do to becomewell-pleasing to God is mere
religious delusion and counterfeit service of God' (Religion, 2601).
In this context, Kant specically analyzes the dangers of the appeal to re-
ligious imagination for purely moral, reasonable faith. It is a form of religious
delusion. We can speak of delusion, when someone has `the habit of taking a
mere representation (of the imagination) for the presence of the thing itself, and
to value it as such' (Religion, 256, Note). As we have shown above, the products
of religious imagination in this way lose their symbolic character, resulting in
the substitution of the things themselves by images. But moreover, man values
these images as the things themselves. This confronts us with the moral aspect of
religious illusion: it creates wrong tracks to become well-pleased to God, whereas
the only true path is a virtuous conduct in life. One of the ways to produce this
illusory state of mind is fantasmatism, i.e. a kind of religious imagination, which
is not only intellectually, but also morally reprehensible. A fantasmatic person is
convinced of the fact that there are other effects of God's grace besides the one that
results from virtuous conduct. Herebywe can e.g. think of someonewho imagines
hearing the voice of God in his mind. This person considers these (imaginary)
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sounds as an unmistakable sign that he is in the grace of God, although they have
nothing to do with any kind of virtuous behavior. In this situation, the productive
imagination produces a representation, which only corresponds to his hopes and
expectations, but not to any sensory experience. For man is unable to know a
supersensible object by experience, in this case to hear the voice of God. We are
dealing here with a `self-deception detrimental to religion' (Religion, 267). The
morally problematic aspect of this self-deception lies in the fact that this person
tries to realize his justication for God by the pursuit of a supposedly intimate
contact with him by means of imaginary representations. In this situation, the
purpose and the means of religion are being confused. The purpose of true re-
ligion is to become well-pleased to God by a virtuous conduct in life. Faith in
the effect of God's grace, as a supplement of the imperfection of our striving for
virtue, can be helpful to this end. But it is essential that this effect results from
the nature of virtue, and this is precisely not so in the case of the fantasmatic
hearing of God's voice or having divine visions and intuitions. Moreover, these
means always have to be subordinate to their proper end, the virtuous conduct in
life. However, fantasmatism contents itself with the supposed possession of the
means, and acts as if this counts as the possession of the purpose. To put it more
concretely: someone, who has visions or supposes to hear God's voice, thinks that
this is sufcient to justify him in the eyes of God, thereby sparing himself the effort
of a virtuous conduct in life. Tartly Kant remarks `fantasmatic religious delusion
is themoral death of the reason, without which there can be no religion' (Religion,
268).
Which systematic conclusions can we draw from the rst section of my
historical-philosophical case study? In the rst place, I think that it is crucial for
religion to take Kant's warning against a naive trust in imagination to heart. `We
play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but (as fantasy) the imagination
just as often plays with us, sometimes very inconveniently' (Anthropologie, 80).
As far as religion is concerned, this inconvenience consists of two kinds of illusion,
an intellectual and a moral one. Kant's analysis has also shown why this illusion
threatens religion much more than other elds of human existence and culture.
In religion, there is no solid empirical base available to keep our expectations
and hopes under control; and this is especially the case for the products of the
imagination, which result from them. Therefore, we cannot test them out. More-
over, religion does not only concern the imaginative powers of man, but places
his whole existence in the sign of God's grace, including his moral and religious
actions. With this, the moral illusion, to which the imagination as fantasmatism
can give rise, comes to the fore. As an illustration of this important issue, I refer to
the translation of the German word Schwärmerei, which in English does not only
mean fantasmatism, but also fanaticism.7 Even without accepting Kant's project
of a purely moral religion, we know all to well to which terrible consequences re-
ligious fanaticism can lead. I particularly think of the people, who claim that God
has directly given them the assignment to kill all atheists and impious, since they
are only pigs, theAmericans in the rst place. Whenwe interpret this fromaphilo-
7. Cf. footnote 5.
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sophical perspective, it is clear that we are dealing here with the disastrous effects
of religious imaginations, viz. inciting people without any rational mediation to
actions that are morally unacceptable. The painful, but important lesson, which
Kant teaches us, is to be extremely suspicious of this kind of religious immediacy.
In sum, Kant makes us sadder and wiser with regard to the use of imagination in
religion.
This leads us to our second systematic question, viz. the implications of a
negative attitude towards imagination for the rationality of philosophy of religion.
In order to avert the danger of religious illusion, Kant states that religion has
to be conned within the boundaries of mere reason. This implies that reason
is to be delineated as clearly as possible from religious imagination; they are
opposed to one another as truth and delusion, truthful religion and superstition.
Consequently, philosophy of religion has an essential critical function with regard
to imagination. Let us quote Kant once again: `Thus if it is disputed that reason
deserves the right to speak rst in matters concerning supersensible objects such
as the existence of God and the future world, then a wide gate is opened to
all fantasmaticism, superstition and even to atheism.'8 From the tradition of
the Enlightenment, philosophy sets itself up as the critical judge, who tests the
doctrines and imaginations of religion against the standard of pure, impartial
reason. Thus, philosophy appears as the authority that can stem the tide of
religious illusion. It does so in the rst place by stressing the symbolic character
of religious imagination. Man has to be aware of the fact that the products
of his imagination are totally dissimilar to the supersensible content of religion.
Secondly, philosophy unmasksman's conviction that he can approachGod only by
imaginations as illusory. Therefore, philosophyhas the task tokeep religionwithin
the boundaries of mere reason. It has an antithetical relation to imagination. A
synthesis of both faculties of the human mind in an `imaginative reason' is out of
question. But which are the effects of this position? Doesn't it involve that religion
is cut off from the affective and imaginative dimensions ofman? Butwhat happens
if religious imagination proves to have a truth of its own, which remains hidden
for the judgment of reason? Can't we `imagine' a truth, which transcends the
boundaries of mere reason, and isn't religion an attempt to relate man to this
divine truth? From a Kantian perspective, the answers to all these intriguing
questions cannot be given. But nevertheless, they are of crucial importance to
religion and the philosophical reection on it. In the next section, I will show, by
means ofHegel's discussionwithKant, that there are positiveways to integrate the
faculty of imagination in religion, without this leading to intellectual and moral
illusion.
3 Religion must appeal to the heart and fantasy of man
The attitude of enlightened understanding towards religious imagination,
analyzed in the previous section, unmistakably has the merit of preserving
mankind from the wrong tracks of illusion. But understanding can only oper-
ate this way at the cost of a high price. Besides the consequences for religion,
8. I. Kant,Was heisst sich im Denken orientieren? Akademie-Ausgabe Band VIII, 143.
http://www.ArsDisputandi.org
46 ] Peter Jonkers
which I indicated above, it also has major implications for philosophy. Is a phi-
losophy, which cannot recognize the mere possibility that imagination is not only
the source of illusion, but can also contain a truth, to which human reason has no
access, still able to pass a fair judgement on religion? Is philosophical reason re-
ally the impartial judge, it thinks to be? A fundamental, critical question presents
itself here: if philosophy, because of reason's inherent craving for power, cannot
or will not offer resistance to its tendency of reducing that what transcends reason
to a moment of a universal rationality, doesn't it become a form of violence? The
fact that this fear is by no means imaginary becomes apparent from the work of
Jacobi, a philosopher who was very inuential on his contemporaries at the end of
the 18th century. He is a critic of idealism, and consequently also criticizes Kant's
philosophy. He characterizes it as an `alone-philosophy', a purely immanent sys-
tem of reason, or a `philosophy of one piece'. It aims at producing its object itself,
with as nal goal to become totally self-sufcient (`alone'). In order to realize this,
it has to dissolve all external objects of knowing, i.e. it has to dispose of all reality
by reducing it to a moment of the knowing ego. Thus, `the philosophizing of pure
reason must be a chemical process, through which everything outside reason is
transformed into nothing, so that only philosophy is left.'9 This remark casts a
dark shadow over Kant's project to limit religion within the boundaries of mere
reason: the shadow of nihilism. If one leaves philosophy to its own rational dy-
namic, it inevitably destroys what it wants to understand. It creates its own realm
of thought by annihilating the real world. With regard to philosophy of religion,
this implies that it reduces themystery of faith to something that reason can grasp.
This leads to the conclusion that reason is a kind of the violence, which threatens
the essence of religion.10
Hegel grew up in an intellectual climate, in which these words struck a sym-
pathetic note. They contributed to get going a process of self-reection of the
Enlightenment. Already from 1750/1770 on, the word `Enlightenment' had been
a popular concept. But the reection on the conditions and limits of the En-
lightenment only started some ten years later, viz. in the circles of the Berliner
Monatschrift, founded in 1783. Philosophers like Moses Mendelssohn and Im-
manuel Kant contributed to this journal.11 As a man of wide reading, Hegel could
quite rapidly inquire into the state of the art of the Enlightenment. But moreover,
he succeeded in grasping the dilemma of the Enlightenment, viz. the opposition
between heart and reason, which was already present in the philosophies of Ja-
cobi and Shaftesbury.12 In his early writings, Hegel reects upon the necessity of a
revaluation of fantasy in comparison to understanding. He brings these diverging
9. F.H. Jacobi,Werke III, 20.
10. Cf. P. Jonkers, `God or Nothing. Jacobi, Hegel and the Pantheism-controversy'.
11. In the December issue of the Berliner Monatschrift of 1783 the theologian J.F. Zöllner
asked the question: `What is Enlightenment? This questionwhich is almost as important as:
What is truth? Has to be answered before one starts to enlighten! And I have nowhere found
an answer to it yet.' In the volume of 1784, Mendelssohn, with his article Über die Frage: was
heisst aufklären? and Kant, with his well-known essay Was ist Aufklärung? gave an answer to
the provocative question of Zöllner.
12. Chr. Jamme, `Ein ungelehrtes Buch'. Die philosophische Gemeinschaft zwischen
Hölderlin und Hegel in Frankfurt 17971800, (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 23) Bonn, 1983, 52.
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tendencies together in a project of his own, characterized by a strong religious
and political interest. However, in this initial period of his thinking he is not yet
working at the development of a post-Kantian system of reason. He rather sets
himself a practical objective, viz. to generalize the program of Enlightenment,
i.e. to help it nd acceptance in the mass of the people. By doing so, he wants to
realize the ideal of his youth, viz. collaborating to the coming of the Kingdom of
God. In a letter to Schelling from 1795 he writes: `May the Kingdom of God come,
and may our hands not rest idle in our lap.'13
Hegel's appreciation of fantasy should not be understood as if he aban-
doned the ideals of the Enlightenment, and switched over to the party of the
counter-Enlightenment. On the contrary, his criticism of the abstract character
of enlightened reason, which he holds responsible for the oppositions and disin-
tegration of modern society, results in an effort to unify understanding with heart
and fantasy. From a more general perspective too, the stress on the emotional
aspects of thinking was not so much directed against the Enlightenment as such,
but has to be understood as an attempt to reveal, with the help of reason, those
domains of the human mind, which were still undiscovered. So, the revaluation
of fantasy as an organ of knowing should be interpreted as a consequence of the
crisis of the end of the Enlightenment, but it nevertheless remains a result of
enlightened thinking.14 Hegel's diagnosis of his time is that the original ideal of
a free religion has actually degenerated into a dogmatic and unfree religion. This
urges him to think about founding a new religion, which does as much justice to
the enlightened concept of a free subjectivity, as to the (classical) ideal of a unity
of God, the cosmos, and the human world.15 Because of all these reasons, it is
worthwhile to examine in this section Hegel's (mostly implicit) criticism of Kant's
project of a reasonable religion and his plea for a revaluation of heart and fantasy
in religion. This analysis will supply us with new elements to answer the question
of the relevance of imagination for religion and its implications for the rationality
of philosophy of religion.
In this intellectual climate Hegel, already during his student years, came
into touch with Kant's critical philosophy, both directly by reading his works
and indirectly through the courses of his professors at the Tübinger Stift. He
is especially interested in Kant's practical philosophy and its consequences for
philosophy of religion. He wonders whether religion can get a solid foundation
on the basis of the doctrine of the postulates in the Critique of practical reason.
From this perspective, he also studies Kant'sReligionwithin the Limits of Reason
Alone, shortly after its publication in 1793.16 As is well-known, Kant situates the
13. J. Hofmeister (Hrsg.), Briefe von und an Hegel, Band I, Hamburg, Meiner 1969, 18.
14. Chr. Jamme, `Ein ungelehrtes Buch', 302.
15. M.Bondeli, `VomKantianismuszurKant-Kritik. Der jungeHegel inBernundFrankfurt,'
in: M. Bondeli & H. Linneweber-Lammerskitten (Hrsg.), Hegels Denkentwicklung in der Berner
und Frankfurter Zeit, Fink Verlag, 1999, 32.
16. Hegel's familiarity with Kant's Religion becomes apparent from the text of a sermon
of June 16, 1793, and from the so-called Tübingen Essay (which is much more important for
this paper) (cf. GW 1. 99). Cf. also M. Bondeli, Der Kantianismus des jungen Hegel. Die
Kant-Aneignung und Kant-Überwindung Hegels auf seinem Weg zum philosophischen System,
Hamburg, Meiner, 1997, 13.
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foundation ofmoral law in the autonomy of practical reason. `The autonomy of the
will is the only principle of all moral laws.'17 Accordingly, man as a moral being is
only subjected to a legislation that is founded in himself as amoral and reasonable
being, but which is nevertheless also universal, as the rst formulation of the
categorical imperative shows. As a consequence of this, any appeal to the will of
God and his commandments as the foundation of morality is out of question. The
transition fromethics to religiononly becomesnecessary in relation to theproblem
of the supreme good as the ultimate end of the moral world. By connecting virtue
(morality) and earthly bliss (sensibility), Kant wants to bridge the gap between
nature andmorality. If the supreme good would not be possible, moral law would
be of no value whatever. Thus, the imperative to realize the supreme good is
nothing else than the imperative to fulll one's duty. The practical necessity of
the supreme good leads to postulating immortality, freedom, and the existence of
God. Only in this way it is possible to reconcile the desire for happiness of nite
human beings (a constitutive element of the supreme good) and the demands of
moral law. In this context, God appears as the guarantor of the unity of the two
worlds, in whichman lives, the sensuous and themoral one. So, religion emanates
frommorality and is therefore part of moral philosophy. The postulates establish
the content of the purely reasonable religion. The only moral motives that Kant
allows in his practical reason, are respect for the moral law and sense of moral
duty. He explicitly excludes all sensuous feelings in his foundation of morality
and his moral theory of religion (see above).
In his thinking, Hegel departs from the results of Kant's ethics and philos-
ophy of religion. During his student years in Tübingen (from 1789 till the fall of
1793) and also later, when he is successively private tutor in Bern (from the fall of
1793 till the end of 1796) and Frankfurt (from 1797 till 1800), he is not interested
in a theoretical foundation of moral philosophy as such, because he is convinced
that Kant had already accomplished this. On the contrary, he wants to examine
how the moral principles of Kant can be used in practice and how they can thus
be realized in religion. In a letter to Schelling of April 1795 he writes: `I expect
that the Kantian system and its highest completion will provoke a revolution in
Germany. It will depart from principles that are generally available, and (when
adapted in general) only need to be applied to all the knowing we have so far.18
So, Kant's practical philosophy serves as an adequate theoretical framework for
Hegel's thinking during this period. But his primordial interest is the application
of morality, i.e. of the Kantian principle of freedom, to religion. This is only
possible through the establishment of a new religion, which has the character of
a moral religion of the people. The so-called Tübingen Essay, probably written
during the period of the end of his student years (1793) and the rst months of his
stay in Bern (1794), offers an excellent illustration of his attitude towards Kant's
philosophy. In this paper I will limitmyselfmainly to a discussion of this text. I do
so because the issue of imagination (or in Hegel's own words: fantasy) in religion
plays an important role in this text. Moreover, we can see here how he struggles
17. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 58.
18. Briefe von und an Hegel, Band I, 234.
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with the question of the consequences of the introduction of imagination into re-
ligion: does it imply that religion has to give up its rational character completely,
or is there a way to unite imagination and reason?
The rst aspect of Hegel's project to apply Kant's moral philosophy to re-
ligion is his attidude towards actual Christian religion.19 It is striking that he
defends a much more critical position than Kant. As we have seen above, Kant
vehemently criticized the confusion of pure rational religion with imagination and
other sensuous elements, since he was convinced that it would lead to all kinds
of superstition. But more in general, he thought that actual Christianity contains
the principles of pure moral religion and can be puried in view of the latter.
Hegel, from his side, takes amuchmore negative attitude with regard to Christian
religion, which he accuses of having destroyed the own religious fantasy of the
people. A striking example of this is a text from 1796: `Christianity has emptied
the Walhalla, cut down the holy woods, and eradicated this fantasy of the people
as a disgraceful superstition, as a devilish poison. In return for it, it gave us the
fantasy of a people, whose climate, legislation, culture, and interests are strange to
us, and with whose history we do not have any connection. In the imagination of
our people lives a David, a Salomon, but the heroes of our native country slumber
in the history books of the scholars' (GW 1.359).
This leads us to the second aspect of Hegel's application of Kant's philosophy
of religion, the relation between intelligible moral law and the sensuous nature
of man, and as a consequence of this, the question of the place and function
of imagination or fantasy in religion. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant
wondered `howone canget the lawsofpurepractical reasonacceptedby thehuman
heart, (. . . ) i.e. how one can make objectively practical reason also subjectively
practical.'20 This effort to subjectivate the objective moral law consists in fact of
nothing else than to look for those sensuous motives in man, which are suitable
to serve as a means to support and promote the fulllment of the moral law.
However, these sensuous motives can never be more than a way that leads to
morality; they can by no means be its principle. The motives that qualify to this
purpose are selected on the basis of a hierarchical order, led by their intrinsically
moral content. Concretely, Kant thinks of the sense of duty in following the moral
law, and of the esteem of the law. In the Religion, he adds to this the purity of
the heart, which is necessary in view of the revolution of man's moral disposition.
This unmistakably implies a negative judgement of themajor part of the sensuous
motives of man. Its context is an anthropology, which takes a negative attitude
towards sensuous nature. As a consequence of this, the fulllment of moral
law gets the appearance of a permanent struggle of reasonable will with corrupt
sensuous nature.21 By asking how morality can be made fruitful to man, both as
an intelligible and as a sensuous being, Hegel endorses Kant's ideas on this topic.
But right from the start, he lays another stress. In the Tübingen Essay, he states
that `sensibility is the main element of all acting and striving of man' (GW 1. 84).
Only from an abstract point of view it is possible to separate pure morality from
19. M. Bondeli, `Vom Kantianismus zur Kant-Kritik,' 34.
20. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 269.
21. M. Bondeli, `Vom Kantianismus zur Kant-Kritik,' 37.
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sensibility. But when one considers man and his life concretely, one has to take
into account his sensibility, his dependence on external and internal nature. With
this statement, Hegel does not turn himself into a protagonist of the moral sense
philosophy. He agrees with Kant that morality has to be based on an intelligible
principle. But in opposition to Kant, he departs from an optimistic view of human
nature. This means that he thinks man capable of converting and sublimating his
sensuous motives into moral principles. Moreover, he does not only think of the
sensuous motives of the singular subject, but especially of the ethical climate of
a whole community. Only a religion of the people is capable of uniting morality
and bliss. This religion is instrumental to produce the moral disposition in a
community.
The foregoing shows that Hegel approaches religion anthropologically; he
departs from human being, starting to think about himself and his relation to
God. Man is not satised anymore with acquired rituals, prayers and their hollow
phrases, but he wants to engraft religion `onto the natural needs of the human
mind' (GW 1. 84). With this, he turns against Kant's depreciation of sensuous
nature, in common with the authoritarian character of ecclesiastical doctrine and
religious formulas, which only regard the external aspect of religion. But besides
this, another issue plays a crucial role, viz. the union of sensibility and rational
thinking. This leads us to the central question of this paper, viz. the relation
between understanding and imagination (or fantasy) in religion and the idea of a
kind of knowing that is capable of uniting them. Before starting the analysis of
Hegel's complex answer, it is vital to keep in mind two things. In the rst place,
there are a lot of tensions and obscurities in Hegel's dealing with this problematic,
as a consequence of which it is impossible to present an unambiguous interpre-
tation of his position. On the one hand, he opposes the warm heart of religious
man to cold understanding: `The operations and the doubt [of understanding] can
rather cool down the heart than warm it' (GW 1. 92). On the other hand, it is also
clear for him that `the doctrine [of the religion of the people] has to be founded on
universal reason' (GW 1. 103). Secondly, it is striking that Hegel describes this
new kind of knowing, which unites understanding and sensibility, onlymetaphor-
ically, whereas the way in which `the ideas of reason enliven the whole texture
of his [viz. man's] perceptions' (GW 1. 85) remains conceptually vague.22 This
becomes apparent from the following quotation: `The [sensuous] nature of man
is, as it were, full of the ideas of reason' (GW 1. 85). Another metaphor in this
context is the one of the salt, which permeates a dish and avors it, although one
cannot point at a lump of salt in the dish. These images do make clear that reason
is present in sensuous humannature in an undevelopedway, and furthermore that
it is spread invisibly in the whole of sensuous appearances. Reason permeates
everything, but cannot be demonstrated as a separate substance.
From this perspective, we can understand the issue of the importance of
heart and fantasy for religion. `The concept of religion implies that it is not a
pure science of God, (. . . ) not a purely historical or well-reasoned knowledge,
but that it concerns the heart, that it affects our feelings and the destination of
22. Vgl. M. Bondeli,Hegel in Bern, (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 33), Bonn, Bouvier, 1990, 96ff.
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our will' (GW 1. 85). With this, Hegel states that there is an opposition between
rational thinking or science on the one hand and man's sensibility or feelings on
the other. Furthermore, he stresses the importance of heart and fantasy, thus
implicitly criticizing Kant's project of a religion within the boundaries of mere
reason. More specically, he agrees with his view on the moral core of religion,
viz. that our duties and laws `are represented for us as laws of God' (GW 1. 85).
But this is not sufcient to get religion accepted by the people. In order to reach
this, our hearts have to be lled with admiration and feelings of humility and
gratitude. Only by appealing to these sublime feelings of man, religion is capable
`to stem the tide of the power of sensuous passions' (GW 1. 85). This remark asks
for interpretation, since it seems to nuance considerably the opposition between
understanding and sensibility, and replace it by an opposition between the higher
and the lower feelings of the heart. Apparently, Hegel is not so much concerned
about the elevation of fantasy above understanding, which would turn him into
an advocate of an irrational religion of subjective feeling and a protagonist of the
counter-enlightenment. His attitude is much more complex. Heart and fantasy
are not opposed as something irrational to the rationality of reason, but are in their
unication with reason able to determine the moral destination of the will. From
this perspective, a duality remains, but it concerns a duality between the lower
sensuous passions and the higher feelings of man, which can be harmoniously
unitedwith his intelligible nature. This qualication of his point of view seemingly
brings Hegel closer to Kant's position. However, the crucial difference between
them is that for Hegel, heart and fantasy are not a means to, but an intrinsic part
of moral religion.
However, Hegel does not content himself with the observation of the unity
of fantasy and reason in religion, but also wonders how it can be realized. This
question is in accordance with his pragmatic purpose, viz. to get religion accepted
by the people. But Hegel's approach also shows that he does neither reect
theoretically upon the way in which reason and fantasy can be united, nor upon
the nature of this `imaginative knowing', which should result from this unication.
He only hints at the capacity of religion to realize this unity practically in a people.
`My aim is not to examine which religious doctrines are of most importance to the
heart, which ones can offer the best comfort and elevation of the soul, or what the
nature of the religious doctrines should be in order to make a people better and
happier. On the contrary, I want to work out which institutions are necessary to
involve the doctrines and strength of religion into the texture of human feelings; I
want to show how to connect them with our motives to act, and how they become
lively and effective in human beings.' If this purpose is realized, `then religion
spreads itself over all branches of human propensities' (GW 1. 90).
The unity of understanding and heart is also important for the distinction be-
tween objective and subjective religion. Objective religion `is des quae creditur;
understanding and memory are the powers, which are active in it, they examine
the contents of knowledge, think them through, preserve and believe them' (GW
1. 87). It is a pure religion of understanding or a theology, which can be composed
by the mind, arranged in a system, and presented in reference books. Subjective
http://www.ArsDisputandi.org
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religion, on the other hand, only expresses itself in feelings and actions; it `is lively,
active in the inner essence of man and externalizing itself' (GW 1. 88). This does
not imply that it is totally opposed to any objective knowledge. The whole mass
of religious knowledge `is interwoven in subjective religion, but this mass is only
a small and rather ineffective part of it' (GW 1. 88). Concretely, this interweaving
implies that objective knowledge adopts a different shape in every individual. The
ways, in which these shapes are formed, depend on the religious andmoral moods
of the individuals, and the latter are formed through education and civilization.
This analysis of the Tübingen Essay shows that Hegel's answer to the ques-
tion of the importance of imagination to religion clearly diverges from Kant's.
With his reection upon the conditions for the effectiveness of religion, he has
made clear that heart and fantasy are necessary for religion in order to inuence
the whole of man. Otherwise, religion degenerates into a system of objective the-
ological knowledge and formal moral rules, from which any vitality has vanished.
But this makes Kant's critical question about the inconvenient game, which the
imagination (as fantasy) plays withman, onlymore pertinent. How can subjective
religion, for which imagination is so vital, preserve itself from illusion? In order
to understand Hegel's answer, it is crucial to keep in mind that the distinction
between religious truth and delusion is as vital for him as for Kant. Just like Kant,
he also refuses any kind of religious obscurantism, to which an irrational use of
imagination could give rise. This becomes apparent from his aversion to super-
naturalism, which was taught by some of his professors at the Tübinger Stift.23
With regard to this issue, he is, just like Kant, a child of the Enlightenment. But
contrary to Kant, Hegel is convinced that the domain of truth does not coincide
with reasoning understanding. Therefore, in his view, the connement of religion
within the boundaries ofmere reason does not only put an end to religious illusion,
but also cuts man off from the truth that is present in religious imagination. Let
us examine his discussion of this issue.
First of all, Hegel does acknowledge that it really is possible for the religion
of a people to become affected by illusion. The religious errors, which are present
in the mind of a people, `are founded on sensibility, more specically on the
blind anticipation that an effect will follow, which is not at all connected with the
cause that is supposed to produce this effect' (GW 1. 95). Faith in miracles and
divine visions are the best-known examples of this. But religious fantasy does not
necessarily lead to errors and illusions, nor does the appeal to understanding offer
a watertight guarantee for the truth of religion. In order to make this point clear,
Hegel does not speak of errors, left alone of illusions, but of prejudices. `There are
two kinds of prejudices: a) real errors b) real truths; the latter, however, should
not be recognized, and known by reason as is the case with [rational] truths, but
are accepted on the basis of delity and faith' (GW 1. 95). Therefore, preserving a
people from religious prejudices comes down to cultivating its understanding in
such a way, that it on the one hand rids itself of the persuasiveness and the power
of errors, and on the other convinces itself by means of a well-founded knowing of
real religious truths. However, the use and interpretation of the term `prejudice'
23. Chr. Jamme, `Ein ungelehrtes Buch', 34.
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show that the matter is not so simple. For actually, a prejudice can turn out to be
an error as well as a truth. But for man as a nite being, it is impossible to make
a clear-cut distinction between these two by means of a well-founded knowledge.
For `which mortal wants to decide just like that what is truth?' (GW 1. 95).
With this statement,Hegel does certainlynotwant to take a skeptical position
concerning the question of truth in religion. On the contrary, there really are
universally valid principles, which are not only clear to common sense, but are
also fundamental for any religion. But in spite of this, there are only a few of
these principles, and furthermore people cannot easily recognize them in a lively
way. In other words, it is difcult to affect their hearts with these truths in such
a way, that religion can become effective. And moreover, it is impossible for
religion to consist only of universal truths. There are always additions mixed in it,
which have to be accepted purely on the basis of delity or faith. Hegel concludes
`that a religion of the people (. . . ) impossibly can be founded on reason alone'
(GW 1. 96), but always depends on faith in a tradition too. With this barely
concealed criticism of Kant's project, he wants to show that there is a truth, which
lies beyond the reasoning understanding. Religion contains truths, which cannot
be known by understanding, but can only be accepted by a community of faith,
which is willing to listen to the voices of heart and fantasy. This implies that
fantasy, besides its pragmatic use to get religion accepted by man, also has a vital
importance for religious man: it can show him truths that cannot be known by
strict reason.24 Furthermore, Hegel states here, diverging from his mature view
of the relation between representation and concept, that it is impossible to give a
rational foundation of these truths. Real errors and real truths occur in all kinds
of mixes in the religion of a people. Thus, in opposition to Kant, reason cannot
operate as a judge, who summons actually existing, revealed religion. It cannot
clearly and impartially judge about truth and illusion in religion. For mortal man
with his nite reason is not capable to decide exactly what is truth, especially not
if this truth belongs to the domain of the immortal and supersensible, in sum the
divine.
This result leads to the second question of this paper, viz. the implications of
introducing imagination into religion for the rationality of philosophy of religion.
In the foregoing, I already noticed that Hegel's answer to this question is all but
clear. The reason for this is that his primary interest in the texts, discussed above,
is not a philosophical, but a practical one, viz. to get religion accepted by the
people. Therefore, he is hardly concerned with a conceptual clarication of the
relation between imagination and reason, and contents himself withmetaphorical
indications. Nevertheless, it is both for religion and for philosophical reection
of crucial importance to examine the possibility of a unication of fantasy and
understanding, of an `imagining reason'. In the foregoing, I have shown that
Hegel uses the concept fantasy in order to criticize Kant's aim to judge religion
according to the standards of `coldunderstanding' (GW1. 92). `The enlightenment
of understanding makes man smarter, but not better' (GW 1. 94). Understanding
24. Bondeli only considers the pragmatic function of fantasy for the religion of the people,
and insufciently considers fantasy as an important approach to the truth of religion. Cf. M.
Bondeli,Hegel in Bern, 98.
http://www.ArsDisputandi.org
54 ] Peter Jonkers
is compared with `a servant, who attentively follows the moods of his masterhe
knows to rake out a justication for each passion, for each enterprise. He is pre-
eminently a servant of self-love, always very shrewd to paint mistakes, already
committed or still to be committed, in beautiful colors' (GW 1. 94). Specically
with regard to religion, this negative attitude towards understanding comes down
to the conviction that it appears to be blind to the sacred, such as man can call it
to mind by means of his imagination and feeling. In other words, understanding
is a reducing, demythologizing kind of knowledge, which desecrates the sacred.
It reduces the holy woods to mere timber and the temple to any pile of stones.
In sum, `by the progress of the understanding many feelings get lost, and the
associations of the imagination become weaker' (GW 1. 124).25
However, it would be incorrect to conclude from the foregoing that Hegel
would reject the rational aspect of religion completely, and consider the latter
merely as a matter of emotion and imagination. For the concepts fantasy and
heart are being used here in another way as well, viz. as an indication of a know-
ing which unies sensibility and understanding. Thus, the question presents itself
`how deep reason may involve itself in religion, in such a way that the latter re-
mains religion' (GW 1. 96). At rst, the answer to this question is primarily a
negative one. Thinking reectively about the source of religious feelings and ritu-
als, about their historical origin and appropriateness deprives them of their `aura
of sacredness'. Consequently, religious man experiences only little support from
such a way of thinking. Therefore, he appeals to wisdom, which is incommen-
surable with science and the reasoning of enlightened understanding. `Wisdom
is an elevation of the soul by experience, connected with thinking, above the de-
pendence on opinions and the impressions of sensibility. If it is practical wisdom
(. . . ), it necessarily has to be accompanied by a quiet warmth, a low heat' (GW 1.
97). The natural warmth of wisdom is here radically opposed to themechanism of
cold understanding. Doesn't Hegel with this statement still become an advocate
of the counter-enlightenment? A tension arises between the ideal of an unbroken
naturalness, which comes close to the idea of a all-embracing union, and the re-
alistic option of Enlightenment, characterized by fundamental oppositions. As a
child of the Enlightenment Hegel knows all too well that one cannot restore the
natural unity, which is destroyed by reection, simply by appealing to an immedi-
ate naturalness. What has broken up the original unity of reection and heart can
only be unied again by means of a higher kind of philosophical thinking. With
this, Hegel goes beyond the ideas of early romanticism.26 But in this period of his
intellectual development, he is unable to articulate this unity conceptually and to
analyze the way in which it can be known.
25. It is striking thatHegel uses in this quotation the term `reason' (and not understanding).
This shows the lack of consistency of his terminology in this matter. It also shows howmuch he is
still looking for an appropriate approach to think religion. When we look at other fragments from
this period, and especially when we examine the texts written during the rst years of his stay in
Jena, it becomes apparent that he specically turns against understanding and not against human
reason as such. As an illustration of this, one can think of the reproach, made in Glauben und
Wissen, that understanding `knows the intuited as a thing, the holy wood as mere timber' (GW 4.
317).
26. M. Bondeli,Hegel in Bern, 101.
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Letme, as a conclusion of this section onHegel's early work, shortly examine
the way in which he solves the problem of the relation between imagination and
understanding in his later work. For as we interpret this problematic from the
perspective of his rst really philosophical essay, the so-calledDifference Essay of
1801, his ideas on this issue becomemuch clearer. By that time, he has recognized
that his project, viz. to cooperate to the coming of the Kingdom of God, can
only be realized in a scientic, philosophical way. In a letter to Schelling of
November 2, 1800, written at the moment that he had already taken the decision
to devote his life entirely to the study of philosophy, he claries the reasons for this
change of perspective. `In my scientic education, which began from subordinate
needs of man, I had to be driven forth to science, and at the same time, the
ideal of my youth had to change into a reexive form, in a system. While I am
still struggling with these questions, I wonder how I can return to intervening
in the lives of men.'27 This quotation shows that he is convinced that a more
fundamental philosophical criticism of his time is needed to realize his ideal.28
In the programmatic introduction to the Difference Essay, he states that modern
civilization is characterized by a number of fundamental oppositions, like the ones
between faith and understanding, reason and sensibility, intelligence and nature
(GW 4. 13). The source of them is the power of understanding to determine
concepts as clearly as possible by opposing one determination to another. By
doing so, understanding drifts further and further apart from the absolute or,
phrased in religious terms, from God. It poses a conceptual construction between
man and the absolute, and connects to it everything that is sacred to man. This
criticism of the philosophy of understanding in the Difference Essay is an echo of
his critical attitude towards objective religion and the power of understanding in
the Tübingen Essay. Its essence is that understanding, and consequently also a
religion within the boundaries of understanding, separates man from God.
However, the way in which Hegel wants to overcome understanding in this
text fundamentally differs from his ideas of the previous period. He is convinced
that a religion, appealing to the imagination and the heart of man is not capable
of breaking the power of nite knowing. Rather, understanding has to be given
a taste of its own medicine. `When the power of unication disappears from the
lives of men and the oppositions have lost their lively relationship and interaction
and become independent, then the need of philosophy arises' (GW 4. 14). This
philosophy should not negate understanding, but has to incorporate it, thus es-
tablishing a reasonable or speculative knowing of the absolute. Reason does not
turn against the oppositions of understanding as such, but only against making
them something absolute. However, the issue is how one should conceive this
speculative knowledge of the absolute. In this text, Hegel does not speak of the
heart or imagination at all as a means for philosophy to think the absolute in a
non-reective way. For these concepts refer toomuch to a sphere that lies outside
philosophical thinking, thus asking again for the problems with which he strug-
gled in the Tübingen Essay and in other texts from this period. In the Difference
27. Briefe von und an Hegel: Band I, 5960.
28. For an examination of the reasons of this change of attitude, cf. P. Jonkers, Can
Philosophy Understand Religion?
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Essay, he conceives `imaginative thinking', being a union of understanding and
imagination, as a speculative union of reection and intellectual or transcenden-
tal intuition. In order to be capable to stem the tide of making the oppositions
absolute, reason has to appeal to an intellectual intuition, which keeps reection
orientated to the absolute. `Besides this negative side [viz. the oppositions of
understanding], [philosophical] knowing has a positive one, viz. intuition. Pure
knowing, i.e. knowing without intuition, destroys the oppositions in a contradic-
tion; intuitionwithout this synthesis of opposites is empirical, given, unconscious.
Transcendental knowing unites both, reection and intuition; it is concept and
being at the same time' (GW 4. 27). This speculative knowing is a philosophical
elaboration of what Hegel only metaphorically and from a practical perspective
described in the Tübingen Essay as a unication of reason and fantasy or an
imaginative knowing.
4 Conclusion
Let us draw a few systematic conclusions from this historic-philosophical
case study. Kant has shown that religious imagination can be the origin of illusion.
How can we avoid that it plays an inconvenient game with us, consisting of taking
our desires and expectations for reality? A philosophical criticism is necessary to
purify the products of religious imagination. And similarly, religiously motivated
actions may never back out of the necessity of rational mediation. All revelations
of God's will through holy books, visions, voices from heaven and other kinds
of religious imagination, should always be examined and interpreted critically
by human reason. In sum, Kant's idea of the court of reason, which summons
religious imagination and investigates its possible effects on man, should warn us
against a naive enthusiasm.
But on the other hand, by going all the way with Kant's project to conne
religionwithin theboundaries ofmere reason, philosophy runs the risk of nihilism.
Paradoxically, nihilism does not only come upwhen rationality is given up in favor
of the will to power, but is also deeply embedded in reason itself, more specically
when it gives way to its tendency to become self-sufcient. Because of its urge to
scrutinize everything as thoroughly as possible, reason on the one hand is lured to
rationalize its object, thus reducing it to amoment of reason itself, and on the other
to repudiate and negate all that refuses rational integration. Concerning religion,
this question comes down to the position that understanding religion inevitably
ends in suppressing it. Everyone, who is a bit familiar with the development of
philosophy of religion in modernity, knows that this danger is all but imaginary.
Therefore, it is vital for philosophy itself to appreciate imagination as a kind of
consciousness that transcends rational thinking as such. This does not imply
that reason is not capable at all of thinking the products of imagination. In
order to do so, philosophy needs a broader kind of rationality than the one of
nite understanding, as Hegel has pointed out. But, as is common knowledge,
his project ends in a radical suppression of religion by philosophy. Therefore, I
consider it to be a task for contemporary philosophy of religion to examine new
forms of imaginative thinking.
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